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Turkey (Mostly) Embraces Obama’s Nuclear
Posture
Mustafa Kibaroglu
US nuclear weapons have been an important part of Turkey’s security strategy since their first
deployment on Turkish soil in the early 1960s. Turkey’s NATO membership and its close
relationship with the United States have been perceived to be integral to maintaining its security.
The release of the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), with its focus on disarmament and
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, has a number of potential consequences for Turkey. This
article provides background on the history of Turkish-US nuclear weapons policy in light of issues
ranging from Middle Eastern politics to the development of NATO’s new Strategic Concept. It then
describes how actors in the government, military, and academia in Turkey have reacted to the
NPR, why they reacted as they did, and how the Obama administration’s initiatives may be
received in Turkey in the future. This article concludes that both military and civilian actors in
Turkey have reacted favorably to the NPR and are pleased by its emphasis on nuclear
nonproliferation and the maintenance of extended deterrence; however, there is less agreement
in Turkey about the emphasis placed by the NPR on the danger of nuclear terrorism.
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The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, published on April 6, 2010 by the
Department of Defense, aims to provide a roadmap for the Obama administration to
reduce nuclear risks to the United States and its allies. The document specifies five key
objectives: preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; reducing the role of
nuclear weapons in US national security; maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at
reduced nuclear force levels; strengthening regional deterrence while reassuring US allies
and partners; and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.1
Turkey has a unique strategic relationship with the United States: an ally and a NATO
member with US nuclear weapons on its soil, Turkey borders a number of Middle Eastern
states that are or have been of proliferation concern. As a non-nuclear weapon state party to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Turkey is seriously concerned
about the future of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As a long-standing member of
NATO, Turkey’s national security strategy relies heavily on the extended nuclear deterrence
offered by the alliance. Understanding how Turkey has perceived and responded to the NPR
will therefore be an important test of the influence of the Obama administration’s policies.
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This article has two main parts. First, in order to provide background on the foreign
and security policies that continue to influence Turkey’s arms control discussions, it
outlines the history of the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Turkey’s soil and how
the country’s strategic environment and threat perceptions have changed since the Cold
War. Second, this article explores the responses of various actors within Turkey’s
government, military, and academic institutions to the Obama administration’s NPR,
with particular attention paid to the country’s role in the nonproliferation regime, its view
of nuclear disarmament and extended deterrence, and its perspective on the threat of
nuclear terrorism.
It should be noted at the outset that nuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation, and
nuclear terrorism do not figure prominently in public discourse in Turkey. In a country
preoccupied with a multitude of domestic problems, the topics of nuclear disarmament
and nonproliferation are often casualties of discussions of other more pressing
developments.2 Proliferation-related issues are followed by only a handful of bureaucrats
in various government offices, some members of the military, and a small cadre of
academics, some of whom also serve as advisers to politicians. Views are quickly circulated,
and it is not surprising to hear (or read) almost identical opinions from many different
governmental sources. The military, meanwhile, is careful not to issue ad hoc
commentaries on these matters, other than official statements from the Turkish General
Staff.3 High-ranking military officers typically emphasize that their views do not necessarily
represent the position of their institutions and that they speak only on the condition of
not being attributed.
The media attention given to these issues in Turkey has grown, though generally
only in response to major events like the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in
Washington, DC. The summit received the attention it did in the Turkish media in part
because Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met there with President Barack Obama;
little coverage was given to the summit’s substance. Similarly, the signing of the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on April 8, 2010 by President Obama and Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev was covered in the Turkish press, albeit only superficially and
perhaps only because of the popularity of the two leaders in Turkey. The release of the
NPR, which took place only days before these other major events, captured even less
attention, with only a few news channels offering commentary on how it would affect
Turkey’s security.4 Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation thus remain very much on
the outskirts of Turkish political discourse.
Turkey and US Nuclear Weapons
The decision to deploy US nuclear weapons in Turkey was made at the December 1957
NATO summit meeting held in Paris. Though US intermediate-range nuclear Jupiter
missiles were first placed near Izmir in 1961, they were withdrawn by 1963 as part of a
secret agreement between President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev
to resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis.5 This withdrawal did not, however, dramatically change
the role that Turkey would play in the nuclear strategy of the United States or in NATO’s
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contingency planning. The United States still sought to display NATO’s solidarity with
Turkey and to demonstrate the alliance’s commitment to extended nuclear deterrence.6 In
the early 1960s, US nuclear weapons deliverable by US and Turkish military aircraft were
deployed at air bases in Ankara, Eskisehir, Balikesir, and Malatya, and squadrons of jet
fighters were assigned to nuclear strike missions as part of NATO contingency plans.7 In
addition, the Incirlik base near Adana was allocated to the United States for the stationing
of nuclear-capable US bomber aircraft.
There were two main reasons for Turkey to host US nuclear weapons. First and
foremost was their deterrent value against the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the
Soviet Union.8 The Soviet Union considered Turkey’s membership in NATO inimical to its
regional interests and an open challenge to its security. In a November 1951 nota, the
Soviets argued that the invitation of NATO membership extended to Turkey*a country
that does not border the Atlantic Ocean*was an expression of the desire of Western
powers to use Turkish territory to establish an aggressive front toward the Soviet Union.
Turkey responded that if the Soviet Union could assess its own status and attitude, it
would understand Turkey’s reasons for concern.9 The Soviet threat only grew during the
1960s and 1970s as the Russians closed the gap with the Americans in the nuclear field.
The Soviet Union also increased its military presence across Turkey’s eastern frontier and
its naval presence in the Mediterranean, and it began military cooperation with Syria and
Iraq. The growing Soviet military presence across the southern flank of NATO led the
alliance, particularly Turkey, to increasingly rely on nuclear forces for security.10
A second reason for Turkey to host US nuclear weapons was NATO’s burden-sharing
principle: since the benefits of collective security are shared by all, the risks and burdens of
the alliance should also be shared. Turkey has subscribed to this principle since it joined
NATO in 1952. In fact, Turkey had already displayed its willingness to share the burden of
defending the interests of the Western alliance by committing a significant number of
troops to the Korean War in 1950, before NATO membership.11
Turkey continues to host US tactical nuclear weapons on its territory, albeit in much
smaller numbers and at only one location, Incirlik Air Base on the eastern Mediterranean
coast.12 All other nuclear weapons have been withdrawn.13 The Turkish Air Force no
longer has any operational link with the remaining deployed tactical nuclear weapons.14
Even after the end of Cold War, Turkish military commanders believed US nuclear weapons
constituted a credible deterrent against rivals in the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq, and
Syria, all of which are believed to have or have had unconventional weapons capabilities
and delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles.15 Although the threats facing Turkey have
changed, Turkish officials continue to view the tactical nuclear weapons as important to
the country’s security interests and to Turkey’s role in the NATO alliance.
Turkey’s Changing Strategic Environment and Threat Perception
The end of the Cold War meant the literal disappearance of the threat to Turkey from the
Soviet Union, causing drastic changes in Turkey’s security environment. The Newly
Independent States (NIS) emerged, and the most striking outcome of this development
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was that, for the first time in the four-century history of Turkish-Russian relations, Russia
and Turkey were geographically separated.16 The minimum time required for Turkey’s
colossal ex-neighbor to launch a conventional surprise attack jumped from a figure once
expressed in weeks, if not days, to one year.17 Although initially this improved Turkish
security, changes to Russian military strategy in October 1993 (commensurate with the
requirements of the so-called near-abroad doctrine) and Russia’s related demands for
revisions to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, gave rise to serious concerns
in Ankara.18
Cooperation with Turkey remained important to US foreign policy for the region. In
Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey was widely regarded by the Western community as
a role model for the NIS. The possibility that Iran, whose fundamentalist regime was
openly hostile to the West, would establish relations with these states alarmed Western
capitals. Undermining Iran’s potential expansionist ambitions became a top priority for
Western nations, and Turkey, with its secular democracy and market economy, was
considered a feasible role model for the NIS.19 Furthermore, the first Gulf War, resulting
from Iraq’s ambitions to become a regional hegemonic power, shook the foundations of
regional relationships.20 With the Gulf War, ethnic conflict in the Caucasus, and
secessionist violence in the former Yugoslavia, Turkey found itself surrounded by
instability in almost every direction. The war in Iraq in 1991 resulted in the United States
declaring a ‘‘no-fly zone’’ that complicated Turkey’s security problems: the region became
a sanctuary for Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorists, who have waged a campaign
against the central political authority in Turkey since 1984, and enabled them to increase
their attacks on targets inside Turkey. (In 1991 the Turkish Grand National Assembly gave
permission for US aircraft to use the Incirlik base to enforce the no-fly zone; that
permission has been renewed every six months since.)
The September 11, 2001 attacks fundamentally changed US foreign and security
policies within the Middle East, culminating in the 2003 US invasion of and war in Iraq.
Relations between Turkey and the United States*now ‘‘neighbors’’ because of the heavy
US military presence in Iraqi territory*took a turn for the worse, as characterized by
tension in almost every area between the two ‘‘staunch’’ allies. One particularly divisive
issue was the US no-fly zones*one above the 36th parallel in the Iraqi north, the other
below the 32nd (later the 33rd) parallel in the Shiite south*that allowed the return of
hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds and were considered by many Turks as a first step in
a US plan to create an independent Kurdish state. Despite US denials, Turkish generals and
many like-minded politicians were very suspicious. The military, in particular, had
witnessed the close coordination of US Special Forces and other US agents with the
Iraqi Kurdish militia throughout the 1990s.21 Still, Ankara allowed the United States to use
its air bases because it wanted to prevent a new wave of Iraqi refugees and because it felt
it had implicit US approval to continue making sporadic cross-border incursions into
northern Iraq, as it had been doing since the 1990s.22
Basing tens of thousands of troops on Turkish soil was considered a key part of US
contingency planning in the 2003 Iraq war. However, during preliminary negotiations the
three-party coalition in Turkey, led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, was replaced by the
single-party government of the Justice and Development Party (the AK Parti), which won
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two-thirds of the 550 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The new Turkish
government resumed negotiations and drafted a motion that would allow US Special
Forces to be deployed in Turkey; however, the motion was not approved. This forced the
George W. Bush administration to resort to an alternative plan that relied heavily on
militia-like units of the Kurdish forces (peshmergas) in northern Iraq, on the Kurdistan
Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Turkey’s decision not to cooperate
militarily with the United States thus strained Turkish-US relations and strengthened the
Kurds*a decidedly negative outcome from Turkey’s perspective.23
Deterioration of the relationship between Ankara and Washington had an equally, if
not more, negative impact on Turkish relations with Israel. Turkey and Israel enjoyed an
almost perfect relationship throughout the 1990s. The 2003 war in Iraq, however, revealed
the contradictory objectives of the two long-standing allies with respect to the future of
Iraq. Turkey feared the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, but
that prospect seemed favorable for Israel’s security given the threats posed by countries
like Iran and Pakistan.24 The influence of Israel on the United States became the subject of
intense political and public debate in Turkey in which Israel was often portrayed as
masterminding the plans for the future of Iraq.25
Turkish authorities’ misgivings concerning the true intentions of their US and Israeli
counterparts with respect to shaping the future of the ‘‘greater Middle East’’ have been
decisive in the improvement of Turkish relations with Syria and Iran. Furthermore, the
basic philosophy of the AK Parti was highly conducive to improved relations with Middle
Eastern neighbors. This new philosophy has become widely known as the ‘‘zero conflict
with neighbors’’ school of thought, the brainchild of Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, later
Turkey’s foreign minister.26 The zero conflict policy adopted by the AK Parti government
aimed to normalize relations among the members of the same family of nations in the
region, which were deeply disturbed by the imperialist policies of the great powers.27
Russia, once a major rival, has become the single largest supplier of energy for Turkey,
including oil, gas, and now nuclear.
Turkish Reactions to the NPR
Turkey’s decades-old strategic alliance with the United States, and the presence of US
nuclear weapons on Turkish territory, makes Turkey’s reactions to the NPR all the more
interesting. The Turkish government and the army are the two fundamental actors dealing
with the challenges and threats posed to Turkey, in a broader context, while issues
pertaining to national security are discussed at the highest level in National Security
Council (NSC) meetings. The NSC does not have authority over the government to impose
its decisions, and its discussions are not released to the public.28 That said, given the state
tradition in Turkey, recommendations made by the NSC on military security issues have
usually been accorded the utmost priority. Should there be a significant divergence of
opinion between the government and the military with respect to national security issues,
the NSC serves as a platform for the two major actors to resolve their differences, or, at
least, make their opinion known to the other side.
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Because the US nuclear weapons stationed in Turkey constitute one of the most
important aspects of Turkey’s national security strategy, Turkish governments have usually
followed long-established state policy. Most government officials believe that this state
policy should not be subject to fluctuations based on short-term political goals or hasty
decisions; hence, the government is pursuing essentially the same policy with respect to
the status of US nuclear weapons in Turkey and has assigned more or less equal
significance to the role that they play in maintaining national security.29 There are three
areas in which it is particularly important to note the response*or lack of response*to
the 2010 NPR in Turkey: 1) the issue of nuclear proliferation, which remains of the utmost
concern to Turkey; 2) US disarmament plans and the future of extended deterrence; and 3)
the priority ascribed to the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.30
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Understanding Turkish Behavior
The Turkish government agrees with the NPR that nuclear proliferation is a ‘‘pressing
threat.’’31 Turkey is a proud member of the NPT and has signed on to every international
arrangement related to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the Nuclear
Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and the Additional Protocol of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Turkey’s official position can be summarized in the
following statement made by the Turkish representative at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference:
Turkey, like many others, regards the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-
proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.
As a country that is party to all major international non-proliferation instruments and
regimes, Turkey remains committed to the full implementation, further strengthening
and universalization of the Treaty with all its three pillars*namely, non-proliferation,
disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The ‘‘grand bargain’’ on which the
NPT regime is founded, rests upon these three inseparable and mutually reinforcing
pillars. In this context, the importance of equal and balanced treatment of these three
pillars cannot be overemphasized.32
Turkey faces severe regional nuclear proliferation concerns, as its security will be
very much negatively affected by an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, if and when this
develops. If Iran builds a nuclear weapons stockpile, it will add to its already militarily
superior position among the Gulf states. The presence of nuclear weapons in the Iranian
military arsenal will upset the delicate balance that has existed between the two nations
since the Treaty of Kasr-i Shirin in 1639. The topographic and demographic characteristics
of the region and the presence of more or less equal military capabilities on both
sides have forced the parties to refrain from confronting each other.33 A nuclear-armed
Iran would tip the balance of power in favor of Iran, threatening Turkish security.
From the US perspective, such concerns may make the May 2010 nuclear deal
between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil (the Tehran Declaration) all the more puzzling. Logic
suggests that no rational analyst in Turkey would remain indifferent, much less lend
support, to Iran’s nuclear weaponization. In addition to public statements, the Turkish vote
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on June 9, 2010 against UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed further
sanctions on Iran, also fueled speculation about Ankara turning away from the West and
toward the Middle East. But this interpretation of Turkey’s vote and the situation is simply
wrong and is likely due to a lack of knowledge about the circumstances under which
Turkey took this stance.
Prior to voting, Ertugrul Apakan, Turkey’s ambassador to the United Nations,
expressed the view that Turkey wished to see a restoration of international confidence in
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. Seeing no viable alternative to a
diplomatic and peaceful solution, Turkey signed the Tehran Declaration to provide nuclear
fuel to the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. The agreement was designed as a confidence-
building measure, which, if implemented, would contribute to the resolution of
substantive issues relating to Iran’s nuclear program in a positive, constructive atmo-
sphere. In other words, Turkey viewed the Tehran Declaration as an important opportunity
for diplomacy. Ankara was therefore deeply concerned that the adoption of sanctions
would negatively affect the diplomatic process. Furthermore, Ambassador Apakan
stressed that it was ‘‘rather unhelpful’’ that the responses of the Vienna Group had
been received only a few hours before the vote.34 Apakan also underscored that Turkey’s
vote against the resolution should not be construed as indifference to the problems
emanating from Iran’s nuclear program, but rather to be encouraging Iran to be absolutely
transparent about its nuclear program and to demonstrate full cooperation with IAEA in
order to restore confidence. Turkey supported a diplomatic solution, but the sanctions-
based resolution was adopted.35 From the Turkish perspective, the Tehran Declaration did
not contradict, but rather upheld, Turkey’s commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation
regime.
Some international security experts have gone so far as to express concern that
Turkey may follow suit if and when Iran develops nuclear weapons. This and other similar
views have been spelled out in various platforms ever since Turkey wanted to embark
upon projects to build nuclear power plants in the 1970s. Neither its attempts in the 1970s
nor subsequent nuclear energy efforts have come to fruition, for reasons ranging from the
lack of a well-defined national energy strategy to domestic political problems. The most
significant hurdle, however, has been Western countries’ fear that Turkey might retransfer
nuclear material and technology to other parties, primarily Pakistan. As a result, the United
States has put pressure on supplier countries and firms to deny the export of nuclear
reactors and related technology to Turkey.36 Ankara finally signed an agreement in May
2010 with Moscow to build its first nuclear power reactors.
In the face of the challenges and perceived threats from developments in the
international arena, some individuals in Turkey do subscribe to the idea that the country
should seek an independent nuclear weapons capability as a credible deterrent.37 These
ambitions are unlikely to be realized, however, provided that some steps are taken by
Turkey’s friends and allies. In Turkey, there is much talk about why Ankara should develop
nuclear weapons*at least among those who approach the issue from the perspectives of
national pride and prestige, and security, too*but most decision makers are well aware
that going nuclear would be a violation of Turkey’s international obligations. State
institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military, are keenly aware of
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these obligations and the costs of violating them. These entities have always formulated
and conducted Turkey’s foreign and security policies in line with Ataturk’s dictum: peace
at home, peace in the world. Against this backdrop, one should not expect Turkey to
embark upon a hasty nuclear weapons program, even if Iran crosses the critical threshold.
Should Iran go nuclear, however, what will keep Turkey from following suit will not
simply be responsible state practice. The extent to which Turkey’s allies are willing and
able to allay its regional security fears will have a decisive effect on Turkish policy makers.
Improving relations with the United States and the European Union, as well as
strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, will make the greatest impact in this
regard.38 Turkey considers the success of the nuclear nonproliferation regime deeply
important to its security, and it goes without saying that the United States*with its
political, economic, and military might*is one of the countries with the greatest impact
on the future of the regime by way of the steps taken (or not) in the areas of nuclear
disarmament, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and
concluding a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty at an early date.
Nuclear Disarmament and Extended Deterrence: Turkey’s View on Maintaining
Security
The 2010 NPR sought to reassure allies while promoting disarmament, a particularly
difficult task when it comes to Turkey, which still considers US nuclear weapons on its soil
important to its security and its role in NATO. Nevertheless, Turkey had a generally positive
response to both the NPR’s focus on disarmament and its commitment to maintaining a
credible extended deterrent to allies, even as the United States reduces its nuclear arsenal.
Two areas regarding the future of extended deterrence cause particular concern in Turkey,
however: the continuation (at least for the foreseeable future) of the deployment of
tactical nuclear weapons in NATO countries; and the architecture and development of a
possible NATO ballistic missile defense project.
A joint working paper co-sponsored by Turkey (and a number of European allies)
and submitted to the May 2010 NPT Review Conference stated:
Nuclear disarmament requires an incremental but sustained approach in which all Treaty-
based nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements play distinctive roles. Treaty-
based nuclear arms control is indispensable for the active promotion of collective
security and cooperation in the pursuit of global disarmament. The unequivocal
undertaking by all nuclear-weapons States to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are
committed under Article VI of the Treaty, is one of the major achievements of
the Treaty process. This undertaking must now become operational, building also on
Article VI and the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed upon in 2000.39
With respect to Article VI of the NPT, Turkish government officials emphasize that
‘‘unequivocal commitments of the nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty should not
be forgotten.’’40 While acknowledging that a significant number of nuclear weapons have
been dismantled since the end of the Cold War, Turkish government officials also believe
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that ‘‘at present, nuclear disarmament efforts seem to be limited to only two nations,
namely the U.S. and Russia, and even then, the numbers involved in the reductions are not
fully satisfactory.’’41 For that reason, Turkish officials maintain that ‘‘on the one hand, the
U.S. and Russia must hold further disarmament negotiations aimed at further reducing
their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons; and on the other hand,
other nuclear weapons states, such as United Kingdom, France, and China must also
commit themselves for further cuts in their nuclear arsenals, paving the way toward their
elimination.’’42 In the same vein, officials also argue that they ‘‘don’t even know how many
nuclear weapons these states have, and while there is no progress in the direction of
reduction of their arsenals, there is also talk of new weapons designs in these countries’’*
referring specifically to the United Kingdom, France, and China.43
Turkey’s interpretation of another key objective of the 2010 NPR*‘‘strengthening
regional deterrence and reassuring its allies and partners’’*is very positive. Even in the
absence of an imminent nuclear threat to Turkey’s security, the view among both civilian
and military Turkish security elites does not seem to have changed since the Cold War.
One explanation for the uniformity of their views lies in the prestige attributed to nuclear
weapons. There are specific reasons that explain why Turkish government officials and
civilian and military bureaucrats want to retain US nuclear weapons on Turkey’s soil, first
and foremost being the perceived threat from the still uncertain international security
environment. Turkish government officials’ views were expressed (in not-for-attribution
notes) as follows:
Nuclear weapons continue to preserve their critical importance for the security of the
[North Atlantic] alliance, yet they are regarded more as political weapons. Our country is
committed to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and thus we support every
effort in that direction. . . . Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that attaining such a
goal will not be possible any time soon, and that more time and patience will be needed
to realize this objective. Hence, so long as these weapons do still exist in other parts of
the world, it is indispensible for NATO to preserve a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal that will be capable of deterring all sorts of enemies in order to ensure the
security of all of its allies. . . . [In NATO’s new Strategic Concept] our country will want to
see an explicit confirmation of the commitment [of the alliance] to the preservation of an
effective and credible deterrent by way of maintaining a combination of conventional
and nuclear weapons capability. In addition to that, our determination for the
preservation of the transatlantic link and solidarity as well as fair risk and burden sharing
to continue to constitute the fundamental principles of the nuclear strategy of the
alliance will persist.44
The above quote emphasizes that while Turkey supports nuclear disarmament, in
the foreseeable future it wants to maintain nuclear weapons on its soil for both security
and political reasons. Turkish officials still see the deployment of US nuclear weapons in
Turkey as part of the ‘‘burden sharing’’ principle within the alliance. They would prefer that
other US allies also continue to host US nuclear weapons on their soil, if only in symbolic
numbers; that way, Turkey will not stand out as the only country in NATO that retains US
nuclear weapons in Europe.45 It was reported in 2005 that there were some 480 tactical US
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nuclear weapons (gravity bombs) that were deployed at eight bases in six NATO
countries.46 This figure has come down to a level around 200 in more recent reports.47
Another fundamental reason why Turkish officials want to keep these weapons has
to do with the nature of Turkish-US relations and Turkey’s place in the Western alliance.
Turkish-US bonds were severely strained during and after Turkey’s rejection of the US
request to station troops on its soil. Many feared that withdrawing US nuclear weapons
from Turkey in the aftermath of such a delicate period would further weaken the long-
standing strategic alliance (or the ‘‘partnership,’’ as many Turkish and American analysts
would prefer to call it).48 Though the relationship has improved since then, Turkish-US
relations have not regained the momentum that existed prior to the 2003 crisis.
Turkish officials also express concern about the true desires of US administrations.
They worry that the United States might have secretly developed, or be in the process of
developing, new weapons systems that would not necessitate Europe-based nuclear
deployments in support of NATO. Should this be the case, Turkish officials fear that the
solidarity principle may be seriously hurt and the alliance might lose its spirit and its raison
d’être.49
If nuclear disarmament moves forward, the NPR emphasizes that ballistic missile
defense will be an important part of maintaining extended deterrence. Turkey is essentially
caught between its relationship with the United States and NATO (who are encouraging it
to participate in a NATO ballistic missile defense project) and its good relations with Iran
and Russia. The international media coverage of the NATO Meeting of Foreign and
Defense Ministers in Brussels on October 14, 2010 might suggest that Turkey and other
NATO members are having a row over the development of a ballistic missile defense
project for the alliance. It is true that Turkey and the leading members of the alliance do
not see eye to eye on every single aspect of the missile defense project of NATO; however,
the degree of divergence of opinion is not as wide as it might seem from a distance.
The missile defense issue has been on the negotiating table with US authorities
since the second term of President Bill Clinton. As previously discussed, Turkey’s political
and strategic environment was significantly different then, and Turkish authorities were
more than willing to deploy air defense systems in Turkey, especially in regions
neighboring the Middle East. Despite extended negotiations, no consensus could be
reached. In the late 1990s, Turkey wanted to have a share in the development of ballistic
missile defense technology*an idea not supported in the United States. A similar
situation arose in the triangular relations between Turkey, the United States, and Israel
over cooperation on the development and the eventual deployment of the Arrow-II air
defense system. While Americans blame the Israelis for not wanting to share this
technology with Turkey, Israelis pronounced almost exactly the same views about the
attitude of their US counterparts.50 The joint project was shelved, and has not been
resumed due to the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations.
Today, Turkey is still willing to be a partner in the missile defense project, provided
that a number of issues are taken into consideration by the rest of the alliance. First and
foremost, Turkey wants to see the project be a NATO project, rather than a US one. Turkey
does not want a repeat of the postCuban Missile Crisis removal of the Jupiter missiles,
where the United States had essentially unilateral control. Moreover, Turkey has doubts as
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to whether the US system would be aimed at protecting Turkey, or whether Israel’s
security would be its true concern. Second, Turkey does not want any country named as
the source of the threat against which the alliance would be developing the project.51
Turkey’s unwillingness to specifically name a state has two motives: it is reluctant to
identify a neighboring country as a target, and it is concerned that Iran will exploit this to
justify advancement of its own missile and military capabilities for defense purposes to the
greater Islamic world and also elsewhere. Therefore, Turkey’s opposition to naming a
country is a calculated decision designed to halt Iran’s growing missile capabilities. This
point seems to be overlooked by many amid unfounded concerns that Turkey’s loyalties
are drifting away from the West and closer to Iran. A third condition is that every single
square inch of the Turkish territory must be covered by the missile defense system once it
becomes operational.52
Turkey is concerned about the future of extended deterrence, and would for the
foreseeable future like to keep US tactical weapons in NATO countries, but it still supports
the United States taking practical measures toward disarmament in the near future,
namely through the ratification of the CTBT and the commencement of negotiations on a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. On the issue of nuclear test ban, the NPR stated that
ratification of the CTBT ‘‘is central to leading other nuclear weapons states toward a world
of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition, and eventual
nuclear disarmament. US ratification could also encourage ratification by other states,
including China, and provide incentives for the remaining states to work toward entry into
force of the treaty.’’53 Not surprisingly, Turkish officials express their expectation that ‘‘this
time the U.S. Congress should ratify the CTBT,’’ and they also argue that ‘‘this is indeed a
moral obligation of the United States.’’54 The Turkish government’s support for the CTBT is
also made explicit in the co-sponsored 2010 NPT Review Conference working paper, which
emphasized that the entry into force of the CTBT ‘‘will form an integral part of a
strengthened and more credible non-proliferation regime . . . [and] all States which have
not yet done so swiftly sign and ratify the Treaty.’’55
Similarly, with respect to the issue of putting an end to the production of highly
enriched uranium and plutonium, Turkish government officials are of the view that
‘‘commencement of negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) to
halt the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons’’ is extremely important.56
An equal emphasis was placed on the issue in Turkey’s co-sponsored working paper:
‘‘Commencing without any further procedural delay negotiations on an internationally and
effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty, and reaching agreement on such a treaty
will offer a vital contribution to the global non-proliferation architecture. Pending such an
agreement, we call for an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons.’’57
Nuclear Terrorism: A Divergence of Views
For the most part, military and government officials and academics in Turkey agree with
the Obama administration about threats as described in the NPR; however, this is not the
case with respect to the primacy the NPR assigned to the ‘‘threat of nuclear terrorism,’’
SPECIAL ISSUE: TURKEY (MOSTLY) EMBRACES OBAMA’S NUCLEAR POSTURE 211
despite the fact that addressing terrorism has been one of the highest priorities of Turkish
governments for decades. The disagreement is not about the need to fight terrorism, but
rather over the credibility of the threat posed by ‘‘nuclear terrorism.’’
Officially, the Turkish government does acknowledge the priority and urgency that
the NPR placed on the ‘‘threat of nuclear terrorism.’’ In his address to the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, the Turkish representative noted the following:
The risk of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by
terrorists and other non-state actors should not be underestimated either. We need to
remain vigilant to cooperate to avoid possible attacks involving nuclear and radiological
material. In this regard, the first and foremost step towards eliminating the risk of nuclear
terrorism is to further the nuclear disarmament efforts and to decrease the role of nuclear
weapons in national security policies. I hereby would like to note the balanced and
carefully crafted outcome of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held last month which
demonstrated the common determination in the field of nuclear security. The
international community needs to redouble its efforts aimed at effective and universal
implementation of all legal means available, including UNSC resolutions 1540 and 1887
and the Proliferation Security Initiative.58
Similarly, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated:
Easy access to [weapons of mass destruction] through trafficking and willingness of some
states to cooperate with terrorist, extremist or organized crime groups increase the
concern that such weapons might end up in illegal hands. In the light of the threatening
dimension of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey
sincerely desires to see that all countries will come to share the goals of non-proliferation
and collectively work towards a safer and more stable world.59
The Turkish government’s co-sponsored 2010 NPT Review Conference working
paper referred to the necessity of dealing with the threat of WMD terrorism. On this
particular issue the working paper stated: ‘‘Nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking in
nuclear material represent considerable security threats that need to be adequately
addressed also at the international level. We recall that a key objective of Security Council
resolution 1540 (2004) is to prevent non-state actors from acquiring nuclear weapons as
well as relevant nuclear materials and technologies.’’60
The working paper also referred to the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington,
DC, in April 2010: ‘‘We welcome the Nuclear Security Summit and the adoption of
the Communiqué and Work Plan, and support the overall objective to secure all vulnerable
nuclear material within four years.’’61 Turkey was one of the forty-six countries that were
invited to the Nuclear Security Summit, and Prime Minister Erdogan attended the two-day
summit; these actions can be considered as powerful indicators of Turkey’s official stance
vis-à-vis the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Many Turkish civilian and military bureaucrats and experts, however, do not
necessarily share the US government’s view that ‘‘the most immediate and extreme
threat today is nuclear terrorism.’’62 Turkey has suffered from terrorism of various kinds for
nearly four decades; approximately 40,000 Turkish citizens have lost their lives, and
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hundreds of thousands have been injured. Turkey has been exposed to various types of
terrorism, from the ultra-nationalist terrorism committed by the Armenian Secret Army for
the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), to ideological terrorism committed by Marxist-Leninist
terrorist factions like the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front, to the ethnic
separatist PKK, to the so-called ‘‘radical Islamist’’ groups like Turkish Hezbollah and the
Great Eastern Islamic Raider’s Front.63
These types of terrorism are believed to pose the real threat to Turkish security,
whereas nuclear terrorism is considered hype*if not a fantasy. Civilian and military
bureaucrats and experts in Turkey do not believe that terrorist organizations are capable
of acquiring or developing nuclear weapons today or in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, when asked why US authorities consistently rank this issue as one of the
gravest threats posed to US national security, Turkish officials almost unanimously express
the view that, ‘‘the US administration wants to create an impression that the world is an
extremely dangerous place and that other countries would be better off if they follow the
lead of the United States in matters pertaining to international security.’’64
Another reason behind this divergence of opinion is the disappointment of Turkish
government officials with the degree of support that Washington has given Turkey’s fight
against PKK terrorism. Turkey expected much more substantial aid from the United States
in its fight against the terrorist organization, which is known to use US-controlled northern
Iraqi territory as a safe haven for sustaining its armed struggle against Turkey. Hence, the
prevailing view among the Turkish civilian and military officials in the lower ranks is that,
‘‘If my terrorist threat does not matter for the United States, why should I care about the
terrorist threat to the United States [i.e., nuclear terrorism], which is hypothetical and
exaggerated anyway?’’65
That said, contingencies involving WMD terrorist attacks are acknowledged by
prominent scholars around the world as ‘‘low probability, high consequence’’ scenarios.66
So, conventional wisdom suggests that there is reason to worry about such a possibility.67
Considering that threat is a combination of intentions and capabilities, and that the
leaders of various terrorist organizations have declared their intention to acquire and/or
develop WMD, it seems reasonable to believe that if they do acquire such weapons, they
will not hesitate to use them. Given this, it is absolutely necessary to take concerted action
against terrorist organizations by collaborating and cooperating internationally on a wide
array of issues. The divergence of opinion between US and Turkish security elites about
the importance of ‘‘nuclear terrorism’’ should not interrupt cooperation between them.
Instead, Turkey and the United States should commit to working through these
differences by conducting more frequent consultations between high-ranking officials
to discuss one another’s concerns and priorities and organize a cooperative action plan in
the fight against terrorism in the region.
Conclusions
In its broadest context, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review was generally positively received
by the Turkish security elite, in that the review makes policy recommendations on a host
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of nuclear security issues that are compatible with Turkey’s grand strategic interests. For
Turkey, a country that has never sought to develop nuclear weapons, enhancing the
nuclear nonproliferation regime is becoming more and more of a priority. The region
surrounding Turkey is associated with the proliferation of various weapons of mass
destruction, which constitutes a serious threat to national security. Moreover, Iran’s
evolving nuclear program creates a multitude of problems that seriously worry Turkey’s
top security elites, including government officials, military experts, and academics.68 The
importance of extended deterrence for Turkey is underscored by these and other
international and regional developments.
Hence, with regard to maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced
nuclear force levels, while strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring US allies and
partners, as well as sustaining safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal, the Turkish and US
approaches could not be more compatible. This is one particular area where Turkish
civilian and military officials speak with one voice. Turkey wants the continuation of
NATO’s extended nuclear deterrence, and Turkish officials are glad to see that the Obama
administration is not rushing to withdraw its remaining tactical nuclear weapons from
Europe. Yet other views have emerged from within Turkish government circles
occasionally suggesting that drawing down the US tactical nuclear arsenal might not be
out of the question from Turkey’s perspective.69 However, the prevailing view among the
Turkish military officials, diplomats, and other civilian officials is that ‘‘it would be
premature to even consider such a possibility now.’’70 All in all, it can be said that the 2010
NPR, perhaps carefully examined by not more than a handful of Turkish experts and
officials, was warmly received in Turkey.
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